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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
and Utah Railway Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
•cm 
d a
 JAN 12 1987 ^ 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, corporation,, 
Defendants-Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents 
and 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
(Case No. 20166) 
(Case No. 20300) 
Consolidated Case No. 20166 
RESPONSE BY THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF'S SIXTH MEMORANDUM OF 
NEWLY UNCOVERED AUTHORITY 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), the appellant and 
cross-respondent, Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company ("Rio Grande"), respectfully submits this response to 
the "Sixth Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority" (the "Sixth 
Memorandum") filed by respondent and cross-appellant Robert L. 
Gleave ("Mr. Gleave"). 
Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that a party is entitled to notify the Supreme Court 
of the existence of citations to supplemental authorities, but 
the written communication to the Court "shall without argument 
state the reasons for the supplemental citations." Completely 
disregarding Rule 24(j), Mr. Gleave argues that counsel for the 
Rio Grande has committed an ethical violation by failing to 
disclose the alleged fact that a federal judge (Honorable Bruce 
S. Jenkins), in an unpublished opinion, "specifically 
distinguished" a case relied upon by the Rio Grande in its 
brief before this Court. Sixth Memorandum at 3. What, if any, 
effect Mr. Gleave claims this alleged violation of ethics has 
on the instant appeal is not set forth in his Sixth Memorandum 
and no effect is apparent. 
The case which Mr. Gleave claims to have been 
"specifically distinguished", The Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co. v. West Jordan Municipal Corp., C-82-344J, was 
itself an unpublished decision. This decision was only cited 
at one place in the Rio Grande?s brief and was cited in 
conjunction with other cases for the proposition that federal 
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trial courts uniformly have interpreted Utah law to vest the 
exclusive authority to determine railroad crossing protection 
with an agency of the State of Utah. See Brief of Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents at page 33, footnote 3. If, as claimed 
by Mr. Gleave, Judge Jenkins later had distinguished the point 
for which the West Jordan case was cited, it would be of 
little consequence since this very issue of Utah law has been 
fully briefed and is now before the Utah Supreme Court in the 
instant case. It is this Court, and not federal trial judges, 
which determine Utah law. Nevertheless, the attack by Mr. 
Gleave upon counsel for the railroad compels further response. 
In sub-point B. of Point III of its initial Brief, the 
Rio Grande asserts the proposition that the authority of the 
Utah Department of Transportation to regulate railroad 
crossings is exclusive. See Brief of Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents at pages 31-34. The only reference to the 
West Jordan case appears in footnote 3 which is found in this 
section of the brief at page 33. This footnote contains the 
following sentence: 
"Although the Utah Supreme Court has not been 
asked to consider the exclusive nature of UDOTfs 
authority over railroad crossings since the 1975 
amendment of Utah Code Annotated §54-4-15, much 
litigation has occurred in the United States District 
Court of Utah concerning this issue and the federal 
district judges of this state have uniformly 
interpreted Utah law to preclude railroad and local 
governments from any authority or duty to change the 
crossing protection at public crossings." Id. at 33 
footnote 3. 
In support of the foregoing sentence, the Orders of 
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three of Utah's federal judges were cited, including the order 
of Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins in the West Jordan case. 
After this brief was written, Judge Jenkins entered an order in 
an unrelated case, Wilde vs. The Denver & Rio Grande Western, 
C-83-149J, which Mr. Gleave claims ?fspecifically distinguished 
the West Jordan case..." Sixth Memorandum of Mr. Gleave at 
3. This is a substantial misstatement. 
Judge Jenkins did not in any way distinguish, 
overrule, reverse or modify the opinion for which the West 
Jordan case was cited. Rather, he concluded that the West 
Jordan decision need not be considered to dispose of the 
particular motion then before him in the Wilde case. 
"The court need not reach the merits of the 
railroad's contention [that the West Jordan ruling 
held that UDOT has exclusive authority with regard to 
railroad crossing protection]. Even assuming that 
the railroad cannot install warnings at grade 
crossings without an express order from the 
department of transportation, the railroad 
nevertheless is not relieved of its duty to operate 
its' trains with reasonable care." Wilde Memorandum 
and Order at 11 attached to Mr. GleaveTs Sixth 
Memorandum (emphasis added). 
The above quotation from the Memorandum and Order 
relied upon by Mr. Gleave in his Sixth Memorandum makes it 
clear that Judge Jenkins assumed the West Jordan ruling to be 
correct for the purpose of ruling on the motion which was then 
before him in the Wilde case. Moreover, later in the Wilde 
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litigation. Judge Jenkins again accepted the proposition for 
which the West Jordan case was cited by the railroad in its 
brief before this Court. 
The Wilde case was settled after the close of 
evidence and just before the jury was to be instructed. Judge 
Jenkins had prepared his jury instructions and presented them 
to counsel. The following instruction was one which Judge 
Jenkins indicated to counsel he would give to the jury. 
"The Utah Department of Transportation has the 
exclusive responsibility and duty to establish and 
locate safety appliances, signals or devices at 
railroad grade crossings in Utah. Therefore, you may 
not find the railroad negligent for failing to install 
additional warning devices at this crossing. However, 
you may find the railroad negligent for failing to 
take precautions within its control that a reasonably 
purdent person in the same circumstances would take to 
avoid injuring the public." 
Although the settlement precluded the jury from 
actually receiving the following instruction, it demonstrates 
that Judge Jenkins continued to hold the opinion that the Utah 
Department of Transportation has the exclusive responsibility 
to determine crossing protection. 
In the Wilde case, Judge Jenkins did not 
"distinguish" his holding in the West Jordan case as claimed 
by Mr. Gleave. Rather, he extended it and was prepared to 
instruct the jury properly that a railroad could not be 
negligent for failing to install additional crossing 
protection. The "newly uncovered" 
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unpublished authority from Wilde v. The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company is not adverse to the ruling for 
which the West Jordan case was cited. Indeed, the Wilde case 
provides additional authority for footnote 3 of the Rio 
Grande's Brief. 
Finally, it is true that both the subject Memorandum 
Opinion of Judge Jenkins and his proposed! jury instruction from 
the Wilde case state that the exclusive authority of UDOT to 
determine crossing protection does not insulate the railroad 
from claims that it was negligent in the operation of its 
trains. The railroad does not challenge this concept. For 
example, the fact that only the State can determine and 
implement the type of warning devices at a particular railroad 
crossing does not relieve the railroad from blowing a horn or 
sounding a bell as its train approaches that crossing. 
Similarly, the railroad agrees that it could be found to be 
negligent if it operated a train through a crossing at a speed 
in excess of the speed for which UDOT designed the particular 
crossing protection at issue. 
However, the railroad contends that so long as the 
other safety factors at the crossing have not changed to make 
the crossing more dangerous than it was when UDOT evaluated it 
(e.g., new visual obstructions), then the railroad cannot be 
negligent for travelling through the crojssing at the speed 
which UDOT assumed for trains when it 
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prescribed the appropriate protection for that crossing. The 
railroad cannot be negligent for operating as it was expected 
to operate by the government agency with exclusive authority to 
determine the warning devices which make the crossing safe. To 
that extent, train operation and the government's choice of 
crossing protection devices are inextricably wed. See Point 
III C. of the Brief of Appellants and Cross-Respondents. The 
West Jordan case was not cited by the Railroad in its Brief 
for this proposition. The Memorandum Decision of Judge Jenkins 
in the Wilde case, however, does contain language which could 
be interpreted as contrary to the railroad's position in Point 
III C. The railroad believes this would be an incorrect 
interpretation of what Judge Jenkins intended in ruling upon 
the particular motion then before him. However, if and to the 
extent the subject Memorandum and Order of Judge Jenkins is 
inconsistant with the position urged by the railroad in Point 
III C of its brief, the railroad requests this Court to reject 
the analysis of Judge Jenkins. 
DATED this /£ day of January, 1987. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
By 
Attorneys for The^Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company 
50 South Main, Suite 1&&0 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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